Boosted by a rocket engine, a ballistic missile sails into space before releasing a warhead that plummets to its target under the force of gravity. Missile defense systems are designed to shoot down such missiles in flight. Although not specifically designed for it, a system capable of stopping intercontinental ballistic missiles can also be used to destroy satellites, since some satellites travel at altitudes and speeds comparable with those of missiles.
Likewise, China demolished one of its fleet in So if countries around the world start ramping up their missile defense, that could have the world tiptoeing closer to space warfare.
Unlike land-based systems, space-based missile defense could take out a missile before it has a chance to release its decoys. But putting missile defense in space would also have antisatellite implications. While enhancing existing systems would strengthen the current U. Many scientists have panned the idea of a space-based missile defense system for various reasons. Missile defenses have as long a history as missiles do, and in the late s American and Soviet scientists came to believe that a defense against long-range missiles would never be effective because the other country would simply build more weapons to defeat it, leading to a dangerous arms race.
Recognized by most experts as unworkable, this expansive system was pared down over the next decade and finally shelved, although work continued on interceptor technology during the Clinton administration.
Then, in , President George W. GMD remains the sole system designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its 44 silo-based interceptors in Alaska and California are designed to be guided by space, ground and sea-based sensors to collide with an incoming warhead and destroy it with the force of impact. The problems are well documented.
Only about half of the 18 intercept tests since successfully destroyed their targets, and the test record has not improved with time: only two of the last five tests were successful—and GMD has still has not been tested under operationally realistic conditions. Despite these problems, however, the administration and Congress plan to expand the system; the current budget includes funding to build 20 additional interceptors. That sounds plausible, but does not hold up upon closer examination.
The unconstrained pursuit of missile defenses can, perhaps counterintuitively, create even greater risks. For example, a belief that missile defense works better than it does can lead political and military leaders to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy and take more risks. Using multiple interceptors against each target can improve these odds, but it does not fundamentally change the situation; the chance of a nuclear weapon getting through would still be dangerously high.
Missile defense is likely to contribute to new world anarchy, and will not protect us from the consequences. These are matters to be considered before any final decision is taken.
Philip Snyder is a physicist in San Diego. The views expressed here are their own. Already a subscriber? Monitor journalism changes lives because we open that too-small box that most people think they live in. We believe news can and should expand a sense of identity and possibility beyond narrow conventional expectations. Your subscription to The Christian Science Monitor has expired. You can renew your subscription or continue to use the site without a subscription.
If you have questions about your account, please contact customer service or call us at This message will appear once per week unless you renew or log out. Skip to main content Skip to main menu Skip to search Skip to footer. Search for:. Monitor Daily Current Issue. A Christian Science Perspective. Monitor Movie Guide. Monitor Daily. Just as carrier groups must be defended against a wide range of aerial threats from any direction, so too must the larger joint force.
It is time to decisively move away from stand-alone sectored coverage from air and missile defense radars. The new default expectation should be that all dedicated air and missile defense radars should either themselves have or be part of true degree coverage. The threat permits nothing less. Skip to content In a world where unmanned aerial vehicles are plentiful, cruise missiles are becoming more abundant, and hypersonic boost glide vehicles are just over the horizon, air and missile threats are coming from all directions.
Omnidirectional Threats After the Cold War, Americans came to take air superiority as a kind of birthright. Radars for U. These sectored, ground-based radars both have single panel arrays with azimuths of approximately and degrees, respectively. A New Sensor Roadmap Needed High level strategic choices will necessarily have implications for subordinate air and missile defense elements.
Table 1. Tracking and discrimination demonstration and test assets.
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